The Agapetic Attitude and the Future of Philosophy by Rose, Mary Carman
The Agapetic Attitude and 
the Future of Philosophy 
Mary Carman Rose 
Goucher College. Emeritus 
Editor's Note: The following paper was 
presented at the Central Division meetings of 
the Society for the Study of Ethics and 
Animals, held in New Orleans, Louisiana, 
April, 1990. 
My thesis is that experience with, appreciation of, 
and concern for fostering the well-being of animals on 
the part of professional philosophers may have 
beneficial effects within philosophical inquiry and 
hence within our profession as teachers. This 
appreciation and concern for animals I will call the 
"agapetic attitude" (from "agape"). After providing 
background concerning human relations to other-than-
human aspects of nature, I will argue that cultivation of 
the agapetic attitude toward animals may improve our 
capacities for observation and interpretation of what 
we encounter in the physical world; may lead to 
contemporary discernment of the value of the traditional 
understanding of the philosopher's attitude toward 
inquiry, and may bring about a burgeoning of creativity 
in respect to currently troubled realist/anti-realist 
discussions among philosophers. I will argue this on 
historical, experiential, and speculative grounds. 
I. Anthropocentrism in 20th Century Philosophy 
The mind and spirit of many contemporary Western 
philosophers have been shaped by diverse anthro-
pocentric views which at least implicitly diminish, 
distort, or ignore the spontaneous appreciation of nature, 
which is a valued experience of many persons. It is 
not, however, only professional philosophers whose 
perspectives on nature have been affected by this 
anthropocentrism; anyone who has taught philosophy 
has encountered students who have somehow been 
already imbued with views akin to Sartre's concepts of 
en soi (in itself) and pour soi (for itself) as these apply 
to the physical world, while there has been little in 20th 
century Western philosophy to foster active appreciation 
of other-than-human aspects of nature. To be sure, there 
is now a burgeoning of world-philosophy, and the 
situation is different with some Eastern thought--e.g., 
the Zen response to birds, animals, and trees. But while 
an occasional 20th century Western philosopher is 
influenced by this or another Eastern attitude toward 
nature, not all Western philosophers are open to the 
appeal of Eastern thought, and a Western fostering of 
love of nature is needed to counteract the dominance 
of 20th century anthropocentrism. 
Aperson whose philosophical education began before 
1950 may have encountered American Hegelianism, for 
which (according to most interpretations) no aspect of 
nature "in-itself' is a suitable objectofany human interest 
And by the early 20th century there began the rapid 
succession to dominaoce of anthropocentric and implicitly 
anti-realist philosophical positions, notably critical 
realism, logical empiricism, instrumentalism, secular 
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existentialism, several varieties of phenomenology, 
and-most recently----<leconstructionism. The anti-
realism of these views is seen in the fact that each of 
them denies at least one of the four presuppositions of 
the agapetic attitude, which is necessarily based in the 
acceptance of a realist interpretation of nature. These 
presuppositions are that entities and processes of the 
physical world (e.g., and here specifically, the animals) 
have their "real nature" apart from human interest in 
them or opinions about them; that some of these can to 
some extent be known; that such knowledge has a 
profound existential effect within human life; and that 
commitment to learning about these objective things 
and states of affairs has great axiological import for the 
human spirit. Taken together these four presuppositions 
serve as a working definition of some forms of what is 
currently known as "realism." And I suggest that the 
denial of anyone of these presuppositions constitutes a 
satisfactory working definition of "anti-realism." 
II.  Experiences with Nature Ignored or Distorted 
by Anthropocentrism 
Clearly, defense of a speculative hypothesis requires 
articulation and defense of its presuppositions. Defense 
of all the presuppositions which shaped my hypothesis 
concerning the philosophical value of the agapetic 
attitude would, however, be too extensive for this essay. 
In this context only the following presupposition requires 
attention:ideally, any philosophical understanding of the 
physical world will, according to its own perspective, 
encompass human experiences within nature in a manner 
that neither rejects nor distorts them. 
Anthropocentric interpretations of nature, on the 
other hand, fail to illumine adequately much human 
experience with nature which is of great significance 
to many humans and potentially to philosophical 
inquiry. There are features of our natural environment 
of which even the most consistent anti-realist must be 
aware, while in his concern with them he almost 
certainly introduces some realist considerations: e.g., 
the loci of possible earthquakes or the threat of a virus 
whose "real nature" is not yet known. And in the case 
of the anthropocentric thinker whose spirituality 
includes compassion, there may be the desire to 
ameliorate the suffering not only of individual humans 
but also of individual animals. 
There are, however, aspects of our natural 
environment which are ineluctably present to virtually 
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all humans· but which only those with the requisite 
features of spirit and mind will discern, while among 
these only some will respond with great appreciation 
and a desire to foster them and our awareness of them-
e.g., the appeal of stars, mountains, birds and bird songs; 
of the plants we grow from seed and in which we watch 
daily the maturation of an organism in which fragrance, 
colors, and mathematical designs are inherent; and the 
perceptiveness, resourcefulness, needs and endearing 
characteristics of the animals to which we give an 
important role in our personal lives. And finally, only 
the person capable of the agapetic attitude will note 
and wish to alleviate the suffering of the animals. 
On the other hand, anthropocentric interpretations 
of aspects of nature, such as those to which I have just 
called attention, do not illumine either the intrinsic or 
the instrumental values these have for some persons. 
First, a Hegelian interpretation of them circumvents the 
fact that it is precisely as other-than-human that these 
aspects of nature are precious to some of us. For 
example, I cherish as intrinsically valuable the delight, 
wonder, and mystery I know in the presence of the 
sparrows and squirrels outside my study window, while 
I am also grateful that these experiences leaven and 
revitalize my spirit. 
Second, I cannot accept an anti-realist interpretation 
of nature as I know it in these appreciative responses. 
Undeniably, it is through my experiences that I know 
the aspects of nature which occasion these responses in 
me. Yet central to these experiences is the fact, which 
is also undeniable, that I am convinced that in them 
something of the surprise which always accompanies 
true wonder is given me, something I did not and could 
not put there, and something which invitationally calls 
me out of myself, giving me some very welcome 
moments of freedom from my self-concerns and from 
the self-consciousness to which a phenomenological 
stance can lead. 
Third, I also value both instrumentally and 
intrinsically my desire to be actively concerned with 
fostering positive human responses to these aspects of 
nature. Hence, I cannot accept a deconstructionist 
suggestion that I experiment with supplanting this 
attitude with indifference to them.! For I have a fund 
of experience which, I believe, supports my conclusion 
that I would do harm to myself as philosopher and as 
human being if I gave up (e.g., "deconstructed") my 
presupposition that because these experiences appeal 
to my capacities for wonder, spiritual and intellectual 
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adventure, and compassion, they are permanently of 
great value to me spiritually, morally, and intellectually. 
I will develop this topic further below when considering 
the possible "deconstructive brncketing" of the agapetic 
attitude. 
The foregoing will repay some analysis. There are 
two types of relation which I may have to the 
experiences I have named. First, there is my 
spontaneous unself-conscious response to particular 
entities or situations in nature, and, second, there is my 
reflection on a remembered moment of that self-
forgetfulness before nature in wonder or concern, in 
response to what I find aesthetically pleasing or to the 
presence of mystery. In these latter indirect relations 
to nature, I recall my capacity for and experiences of 
self-forgetful appreciative response to other-than-
human aspects of nature and the effects of these 
responses within my mind and spirit. Moreover, in this 
reflection on these experiences I find ingredients which 
are of the highest importance to me: my wonder that 
these objects and situations exist, my spontaneous 
presupposition I did not make them, my desire to assume 
a stewardship of them, and my vivid and cherished 
memory that in these experiences I am totally taken up 
with something not myself. 
To be sure, some individuals may be unaware of, 
uninterested in, or even repelled by the aspects ofnature 
which make these experiences possible for me. From 
my observations of others I have concluded that these 
persons seem to be "locked" within their own 
experiences. Whatever they encounter in nature they 
analyze as though its most significant aspect is that it is 
their experience. I am reminded of a colleague who 
during the 1940's, when American philosophy was 
dominated by logical empiricism, instrumentalism, 
critical realism, or a combination of these positions, 
referred to a St. Bernard dog as a "gestalt." To be sure 
an artist might on occasion speak of an animal in that 
manner. But I knew this person's philosophical 
preference and that his words were consciously intended 
to communicate his experience of the dog as a 
configuration of color, form, lines, and massive 
presence. According to my lights, however, this 
affectionate and intelligent animal possessed a very 
interesting subjectivity of its own which I believed I 
could discern only partially and indirectly. 
There are a number of psychological, emotional, 
experiential, educational, and spiritual reasons why an 
individual might be capable only of an anti-realist 
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interpretation of the physical world. This brings us to 
criticism ofcontemporary approaches to nature, an area 
of great significance for the spiritual and intellectual 
development of individuals per se, scientific inquiry, 
present-day philosophical creativity, ecological issues, 
and all compassionate, humane considerations. Three 
possible explanations of a preference for anti-realist 
interpretations of sensory experiences are (1) the 
narcissistic inability to take an interest in what is not 
one's experience; (2) a lack of experience, knowledge, 
or imagination concerning the multifaceted value of 
interpreting these experiences as encounters with other-
than-human entities which merit our wonder, 
appreciation, admiration, affection, and compassion; 
and (3) the effects of acceptance ofone or a combination 
of the severnl forms of anti-realist anthropocentrism. 
Before turning to consideration of the agapetic 
attitude in respect to the higher animals, we recall that 
some persons do not live in terms of an anthropocentric 
perspective on the physical world but, rather, "see" 
entities or situations in nature as having an objective 
existence apart from their experience of them. The 
capacity for this stance, however, is not always 
accompanied by the agapetic attitude. One may desire 
to achieve objective truth concerning nature yet be 
interested only in the import which that truth has for 
one's concerns. And having discerned this import, one 
may be only exploitative of nature. On the other hand, 
belief in some form of realism is necessary for 
enlightened, appreciative interest in what I will call "the 
whole animal", and I use that expression here to include 
the animal's "real nature," which it possesses by virtue 
of both its species and its idiosyncratic characteristics, 
and also its subjectivity as well as its behavior and 
appearance. Again, this may be a passive interest-
e.g., one's pleasure in contemplating what one believes 
one has discerned about lions, horses, or chipmunks. 
But it need not be passive; it may be a compassionate 
and active concern for the animals' well-being-i.e., it 
may be the agapetic attitude. 
III. The Higher Animals and the Agapetic Attitude 
Although none of the anthropocentric views is 
adequate to support agapetic reflection on the animals, 
some of these views have drawn attention to a 
dimension of philosophical inquiry which is useful in 
this context. From the several forms ofphenomenology, 
existentialism, and instrumentalism we have learned 
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that in some aspects of philosophical inquiry we not 
only may but must draw on our personal experiences. 
This I have done. In respect to what I believe I have 
discerned of the interior life of animals, however, I am 
able to be brief. For among those who have an 
appreciation of animals, these experiences are well 
known, although it is useful here to make explicit some 
concrete details on which I have based my conclusions. 
I believe that in the animals I find their enjoyment 
ofplay; their delight in each other's companionship and 
in that of the humans they trust and love; and their desire 
to give and to receive affection in respect to other 
animals and also to humans. I also believe I have found 
in them concern for each other and some indication of 
their concern for me when I have been distressed. 
Again, I believe they have real emotional needs which 
arise from their fears, insecurities, anxieties, and 
physical pain, and, when I have been present on these 
occasions, I believe they have looked fixedly into my 
eyes not with peace and affection but with trust and 
expectation that I will come to their aid. 
IV. Intellectual and Spiritual Roles of the Agapetic 
Attitude 
In at least three ways the agapetic attitude serves 
and is served by both the intellect and the spirit, whether 
or not the individual who sustains the attitude is a 
philosopher. 
(1) Concerning the animals, the agapetic person 
will endeavor to think clearly, cautiously, and with 
integrity. For it is likely that spontaneously and 
unreflectively he desires to minimize human action in 
terms ofa distorted conception of the nature of animals 
and a willingness to dominate them destructively. 
Hence, while implicitly he presupposes that he is able 
to achieve some understanding of the subjectivity of 
particular animals, ideally he is also willing to answer, 
rather than ignore, the charge that in this belief he is 
being anthropomorphic. For when this presupposition 
is undefended, the agapetic attitude toward animals is 
vulnerable. On the other hand, if his belief that he has 
know ledge of the subjectivity of some animals can be 
justified, then those who see this belief as anthro-
pomorphic are rejecting opportunities to make 
discoveries about animals and the capacities of animals 
for subjective well-being or suffering. And, again, 
ideally, the agapetic person is willing to point this out, 
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not wanting others to reject the opportunity for learning 
about the animals, for increasing the well-being of 
animals, and for ameliorating some of their suffering. 
(2) This possibility bestows on the agapetic person 
the hope that in his encounter with animals he does not 
meet only the content and ethos of his own spirit 
projected on selected aspects of nature, although in the 
case of the person who is not a philosopher this hope is 
likely to remain unexamined. Besides his impulse to 
foster the well-being of animals, the agapetic person at 
least implicitly has an appreciation of the importance 
to his intellect and spirit of his accepting the adventure 
of discovery in respect to animal nature. 
(3) Further, if there are animals to whom we are 
able to render good service, whether these animals enjoy 
being our companions or prefer to be alone in their 
uncultivated environment, then perhaps both non-
philosopher and philosopher need to reflect thoroughly 
and hopefully on the presupposition that we can 
genuinely come to know at least some characteristics 
of these animals. But how come to know them? Have 
we not learned from several varieties of anthro-
pocentrism that in our reflection on any aspect ofnature 
we are reflecting only on our human experiences of 
nature which are necessarily acculturated, and may be 
idiosyncratic? Here, as it did above, a contemporary 
deconstructionist approach comes to our aid. But now 
we will use this approach specifically in respect to our 
attitude toward the animals. Let us ask: What would 
be lost to us if we were to give up the agapetic attitude 
and supplant it with an indifference to the animals or 
a willingness to exploit and dominate them? But let 
us ask this question not only as intellectual exercise or 
as deliberate challenge to a fairly widespread 
interpretation of our relation to nature. Let us ask it, 
rather, as a part of our effort to justify the agapetic 
person's view that our observations are clues to the real 
nature of the animals. 
We may ask this question in respect to both our own 
spirit and mind and our interpretation of those of others. 
And we ask it for the sake of gaining support for the 
hypothesis that the agapetic attitude has beneficial 
effects on the valuational nature and the intellect of the 
person who sustains it. Having tried this myself, I 
believe that there is no lack of evidence that the 
sustaining of the attitude has such effects. Thus, the 
individual's kindly, inviting attitude toward an animal 
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can make a difference in the animal, freeing and 
enabling it to develop and/or to reveal some 
characteristics which otherwise might have remained 
dormant or hidden. Also, the individual becomes a more 
patient, discerning, and responsive observer of animals, 
and perhaps ofother aspects of nature. And his kindness 
being reinforced by his awareness of the animals' 
positive response to him, he may develop a new or 
increased inclination to give kindness to humans. 
V. The Relevance of the Agapetic Attitude to 
Philosophical Inquiry 
What may legitimately be said concerning the effects 
of the agapetic attitude on philosophical reflection? In 
part my conviction of the philosophical importance of 
the agapetic attitude derives from my reflection on my 
experience-i.e., my common sense experience with the 
cultivation of that attitude; my experience which is derived 
from my giving the attitude roles in my own philosophical 
reflection; and my observing the effectiveness of the 
attitude in the lives and the philosophical inquiry of those 
philosophical colleagues in whose intellectual and 
spiritual stance I believe I have discerned it. Thus, I 
suggest that the agapetic attitude creates and develops in 
the person who sustains it the desire and the intention to 
encounter and to achieve some acquaintance with 
responsive forms oflife that are not human. Furthermore, 
this person has truly self-forgetful moments when he aims 
to "bridge the species gap" in admiration, wonder, 
compassion, affection, delight in the mutuality of the 
companionship he has with some animals, his taking 
advantage of opportunities for doing acts ofkindness for 
them, and his discovery of the animals as loci of the 
unknown and of mystery. 
Further, the agapetic attitude needs to be continually 
shaped by a realism and hence has significance for 
realist/anti-realist issues. The realisms which support 
the agapetic attitude, however, will be diversified. The 
Hindu, Jew, Taoist, Christian, or naturalist may share 
the agapetic attitude, but their views of the content and 
structure of reality and of the investigative capabilities 
of the human mind will not be the same. This fact has 
a two-fold significance for contemporary philosophy. 
It brings both Eastern and Western thought into 
philosophical inquiry, thereby furthering the 
development of world philosophy, and knowledge of 
the de facto diversity of realist views may prevent a too 
narrow development of interest in realism. 
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As I have already suggested, the intellectuality and 
spirituality of the agapetic attitude make for more 
accurate and thorough discerning of what is before us 
in the animals than is possible without that attitude. The 
anti-realist believes that she cannot have knowledge or 
empathetic awareness of the animals per se. She 
discounts evidence that this belief is not true, although 
the realist is likely to believe that the anti-realist finds 
evidence in support of some form of realism in virtually 
all her encounters with nature. On the other hand, the 
realist whose spirit is not imbued with the agapetic 
attitude and who is indifferent to, or who wishes to 
exploit, the animals sees only what is of interest to her 
and interprets what she sees in terms of her own 
interests. This raises the question of whether the person 
who, possessing the agapetic attitude, loves and wishes 
for the well-being of what she observes, can be 
intellectually "objective." Of course, the immaturity 
or the pathology of love and concern lead to distortion 
in observation. The person who is capable of mature 
love and concern, however, wants to know what she 
loves according to its own nature and not according to 
her wishes. 
There are also historical reasons for drawing the 
agapetic attitude into philosophical reflection. My 
spontaneous appreciation of this attitude was 
encouraged when, upon first reading the Dialogues of 
Plato, I found what seemed to me to be intimations of 
our present-day experience with the attitude and its roles 
in our lives. (Of course, one need not read Plato as I 
am reading him, but I think there is no compelling 
evidence against this reading.) I have in mind Plato's 
interest in the love of truth, of the areas in which we 
seek truth, and of the situations in which we use the 
truth we achieve. Thus, Plato draws attention to the 
lovers of philosophical truth: Diotima says of the 
philosophers' achievement ofknowledge of the Ideas, 
"And this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former 
toils...."2 Further, not all humans are philosophers, and 
Diotima sees the fulfillment of the "birth of beauty" as 
possible for persons who work faithfully with true 
opinion.3 In the "Symposium" there is an emphasis on 
eros, i.e., on our spiritual as well as our intellectual needs 
for truth, but there are other dialogues in which there is 
a promise of fulfillment of our needs not in being served 
by truth but in our serving truth. This is expressed, for 
example, in many poignant lines in the "Republic": e.g., 
"Observe, Glaucon, there will be no injustice in 
compelling our philosophers to have a care and a 
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providence of others."4 On the other hand, although it 
could be cogently argued that agape is not unambig-
uously present in Plato's Dialogues, itis clear that agape 
is present in Bonaventura's admonition that we should 
not make the mistake of believing that "it suffices to 
investigate without wonder, examine without 
exaltation,...know without love.',5 
There are at least two aspects of the historical 
grounds for drawing the agapetic attitude into current 
philosophical reflection. First, I have suggested above 
that the view that investigative capacities increase 
when they are fired by the zeal of the agapetic attitude 
may become for us a philosophical hypothesis (i.e., 
not dogma, axiom, decision, or expression of 
preference) and as such may be assessed, developed, 
and defended by reference to our concrete experience 
with it. Second, if support for this hypothesis can be 
found, then this event may help introduce into 
philosophical inquiry an endeavor to find in the 
history of philosophy accomplishments which have 
value for us today, even though they were conclusions 
of minds educated within a culture incommensurate 
with ours. Willingness to assess the hypothesis 
concerning the permanent value of the agapetic attitude 
could give new import to historical studies and to 
societies dedicated to these studies. 
Finally, those of us who teach and publish our 
philosophical reflections may have significant effects 
on the values and intellects ofothers. And one way we 
can plant the seeds of more adequate philosophical 
thought is by assessing for possible integration into our 
reflection aspects of our everyday lives that are of 
proven value to us yet are often ignored or rejected by 
philosophical inquiry. For some of us the importance 
of our agapetic attitude toward the higher animals is a 
prime example of highly valued aspects ofour concerns 
upon which in our day philosophical significance is not 
often bestowed. And in this essay we have noted several 
areas ofphilosophy that might benefit substantially from 
attention to this attitude: the philosophical need for 
adequate observation of experience, issues of realism/ 
anti-realism, investigative roles of the thinker's attitude 
toward his inquiry, and the improvement ofour attitudes 
to other-than-human aspects of nature and above all to 
the higher animals. 
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1 See, for example, the "ethos" of Jacques Derrida's "I 
have forgotten my umbrella." 
2 Plato, "Symposium" in The Dialogues ofPlato, trans. 
by B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), Vol. I. 
p.334. 
3 Ibid., page 331. (Steff. 206) 
4 Plato, "RepUblic", Book vn. p. 779. Op. Cit. 
S Saint Bonaventura, The Mind's Road to God, trans. by 
George Boas (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), Prologue, 
p.5. 
I stare at tree-covered mountain across the way, 
Shuddering at repeated volleys. 
In those woods walks beauty 
That can't be destroyed or dragged out by hunters. 
They've cheated themselves-
The corpses on car hoods are devoid of the Presence 
Still in the woods, 
Shadows walking quietly with those who come in peace. 
Betty Jabn 
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